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On June 18, 1933, the Congress of the United States enacted
the "Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, " 1 author-
izing the establishment of the office of Federal Coordinator of
Transportation. On June 16, 1936, Title I of that act expired,
and with it the office of Coordinator.2 However, the significance
of the experience gained during the three short years of the
existence of the statute did not cease with it. From the point of
view of governmental administration of regulation something had
been learned which, when placed against its own proper back-
ground in the current of historical development and experience,
may prove to be of great value in the guidance of men's affairs in
the future.
The Federal Coordinator of Transportation office was both
conceived and born in darkest days of national emergency. The
nation's industry as a whole was at a low point, and the railroad
industry in the deepest depths. It was essentially an emergency
measure, but it was something more. It was an experiment em-
bodying the extension in the field of transportation regulation
to an almost unprecedented degree of the function of govern-
ment as a manager and at the same time of the formal use of
persuasion in administration, the second extension to temper the
first. A new note had been struck in the Transportation Act,
1920,3 whereby "regulation" took on an affirmative meaning
in addition to its long established negative meaning.4 In a sense
* Attorney at law, New York City. LL. B., 1937, Harvard Law
School.
148 Stat. 211. Throughout this paper, except when the context
clearly indicates otherwise, the use of "the Emergency Act" refers
to Title I of the Act. Title II is briefly treated in note 58.
2Infra, Part III. Presidential Proclamation of May 2, 1934, and
Senate Joint Resolution 112, each of which in its turn extended the
term of the office for one year.
3 41 Stat. 456.
4 Wisconsin Rate Cases, 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922); New
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the Emergency Act of 1933 was a trial balloon sent up in the
direction of an even more intense application of this new mean-
ing. During the War the government had frankly assumed the
responsibility for unified operation of the railroads, by vesting
the power of management in the Director-General, a government
officer, although much of the actual direction was carried on by
the individual managements as before. Now, during an emer-
gency of but slightly lesser proportions, an analogous technique
was employed to bring some order out of the disrupted and dis-
ordered conditions in the American transportation industry, but
one which differed widely from the War scheme in two impor-
tant respects, the responsibility was left with the railroads them-
selves, and central in the Emergency Act scheme was the estab-
lishment of machinery for mutual exchange of thought and for
cooperative action of government and management in a joint
attack on the problem. Clearly, however, the problem would not
completely disappear with the emergency, and it is difficult to
believe that those who conceived such an extensive and far-
reaching scheme were not unaware of the possibility of project-
ing it into the future on a more permanent basis, if experience
under it proved favorable. It is significant that in neither the
Presidential Proclamation nor in the Congressional Joint Reso-
lution6 extending the term of operation of the Act was there
mention of any continuation of the emergency. Accordingly, it
would seem a valid conclusion that the Emergency Act, while
essentially an emergency measure, represents an experiment not
only in meeting the problem of extreme emergency but also look-
ing to the orderly resolution of similar problems arising in less
stormy times.
To those seeking to measure permanent influence in terms
of orders issued or concrete action inspired for which due credit
is given the contribution of the Coordinator will seem meagre
England Divisions, 261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1923); Dayton Goose
Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924).
Sharfman, "The Interstate Commerce Commission", Vol. 1, pp. 76
et seq.
R. W. Harbeson traces the manifestation of this affirmative policy
back to the Commission's concern with considerations of general
efficiency and effectiveness in connection with general rate level investi-
gations, citing as the earliest example Advances in Rates, 20 I. C. C.
243, 305, 307 (1911), 42 J. Pol. Econ. 106 (1934).
, Supra, n. 2.
K. L. J.-3
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indeed. Actually, if an opinion may be ventured at as early a
stage as this, the Coordinator's lasting influence both in the
sphere of railroad management and in that of transportation
regulation was substantial. Congress established the office with
the hope of stimulating and facilitating voluntary action by rail-
roads to help themselves out of their financial troubles by work-
ing together to eliminate wastes and other preventable expenses.0
The railroads of the United States had been built and developed
against a background of inter-railroad competition, to foster
which had been the traditional governmental policy, as expressed
in the Interstate Commerce Act and its many amendments and
in the anti-trust laws. Having already opened the door a limited
amount to joint carrier action in the Transportation Act,7 in
bold reversal of this traditional policy, Congress now proceeded,
in the Emergency Act, to throw open wide the door to legitimate
cooperation and furthermore to reinforce this by directing the
Coordinator to seek out and discover opportunities for profitable
joint action through wide research and study,8 conferring on that
agency power to order such cooperation under certain circum-
stances. 9 In practice the Coordinator found himself so ham-
pered by the temporary footing on which the statute placed him
as well as by certain other restrictions contained therein that he
was compelled to devote the efforts of the Coordinator organiza-
tion largely to performance of the first of these functions.
During the period of the Coordinator's existence only one
major order of any consequence was issued, and but three minor
orders, but fortunately progress does not come only through
orders. No less than sixty reports were issued in a little over
three years, analyzing with thoroughness and great suggestive-
ness the majority of those transportation problems which are
peculiarly national in character and on which study with per-
spective was needed, and in addition a good many more special-
ized problems narrower in scope. For example, in the former
class were studies on merchandise traffic' o and freight car pool-
6 Emergency Act, section 4.
7 Spra, n. 3; Amending section 5 of the Int. Com. Act, as to pool-
ing, combination, and consolidations.
sEmergency Act, section 13.
lIbid., sections 5 and 6.
0"Merchandise Traffic Report", issued March 22, 1934.
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ing" and in the latter more specialized studies of a proposed
merger of the Long Island and the Pennsylvania Railroad, 12 and
on "Preservative Treatment of Railroad Ties.''13 These reports
and the ideas contained in them were given wide circulation both
among railroad men, for whom they were most pertinent,
although they embraced many transportation subjects not
directly concerning the railroads, and among the general public,
both by formal submission to the Regional Coordinating Com-
mittees sanctioned by the Act, by conferences formal and infor-
mal, and by the Coordinator's many public addresses. 14 Suf-
fice it to say that, while only a few of the specific proposals were
translated into action, the whole tone of thinking in the railroad
world, the kind of considerations, the criteria to be used, the new
language and ideology of coordination and cooperation,"5 the
whole tone was set by these emanations from the Coordinator's
office, and it was definitely a new tone for most men in an indus-
try where "American individualism" was still very deeply
entrenched. 16
n"Freight Car Pooling and Plan for Proposed Box Car Pool" issued
Oct. 23, 1934.
""Report on P. R. R.-L. I. Merger", Oct. 2, 1933.
"3 Issued May 29, 1936.
" Coordinator Eastman delivered 52 prepared addresses and numer-
ous informal talks to Chambers of Commerce, Railroad Associations,
labor groups and other interested bodies. "A List of the Prepared Ad-
dresses, Questionnaires, Reports, and Miscellaneous Statements of the
Federal Coordinator of Transportation", pp. 1-5. Important staff mem-
bers also carried on this work.
zPerhaps the most important single idea that was effectively put
across was the germinal idea of coordination itself. "Coordination"
may refer to either or both of two processes, one, cooperation between
units of the same form of transportation agency, as for example, to form
a unified national railroad system, the other, integration of different
types of transportation agencies as in rail-highway or rail-air service.
Congress by using the name "Emergency Railroad Transportation Act,
1933" and by limiting its operation to railroads stressed the first mean-
ing, and Coordinator Eastman ordinarily used the word in this sense
(Moulton, 55 Traffic World 833). In this paper it will be so used,
except where context clearly indicates the broader inclusive meaning
is intended.
"In this regard the following statement by the Coordinator in
Jan., 1934, is significant: "The fact is, however, that these recom-
mendations (as to various proposals) frequently fail to general adop-
tion because of the high degree of individualism among the railroad
managements, Carrier officials may resist because of pride of opinion or
even for fear that adoption of the recommendation would in some
way threaten their individual importance, but to a certain extent each
railroad handles matters in its own way. Similar difficulties have
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Besides the sixty reports above referred to were five devoted
to questions of transportation regulation. Of the eight impor-
tant legislative recommendations made the Congress has re-
sponded to three,17 joint carrier-employee agreements have
obviated another, and final action awaits the others. In other
ways also did the Coordinator affect the course of legislation.
His testimony was sought as a matter of course by Congressional
committees considering transportation legislation.18 Important
legislation was submitted to his staff for criticism before enact-
ment.' 9 The other parts of these legislative reports and the
other reports were also effective in bringing into common view
the kind of considerations to be weighed and the nature of the
problem involved in legislation for the regulation and improve-
ment of the American transportation system.
That the work of the Coordinator was accomplished by
informal and unusual methods rather than by formal and official
"legal" acts, does not diminish the importance for the student
of administrative law of the legal background against which
that work was performed. Appended onto the great underlying
charter of American railroad regulation, the Interstate Com-
merce Act, and onto the well-developed and effective regulatory
system developed by the incomparable Interstate Commerce
Commission under it, was this comparatively diminutive emer-
gency experimental measure, the Emergency Act, with its small-
scale administrative agency, the Coordinator. The fact that a
member of the Commission was appointed Coordinator only
serves to emphasize the fact that the latter Act and the latter
office, while owing to the circumstances which prompted the
enactment of the underlying statute, the nature of its function
was somewhat different, can only be understood when thought
of and interpreted in the light of the whole administrative expe-
rience and legal background of the former. Consequently, the
interaction which existed between the Commission and the
Coordinator, immeasurable as it was by its very nature, suggests
a corresponding interplay between the legal doctrine centering
been experienced by the association of Railway Executives in its
activities." (Coordinator's First Report, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., S.
Doc. 119, 10-11 [1934).)
See infra, n. 138.
See infra, n. 150.
"See infra, n. 148, 149.
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on the Interstate Commerce Act and the legal questions raised
by the Emergency Act.
While in only one case was the scheme established by the
Emergency Act directly subjected to judicial scrutiny,2 0 it is
thought profitable to discuss in general outline some of the main
problems raised by the Act. This for the reason that it is not
inconceivable that other acts drawn up along similar lines may
be enacted in the future to which such discussion would apply,
but most of all for the reason that, although there was little
litigation, the very fact of the possibility of litigation was not
without its impress both on the normal course of action taken
by the Coordinator and on the judicial world in which such liti-
gation, had it eventuated, would have occurred. Questions of
construction of the basic statute cannot be ignored even in the
course of this kind of treatment, for in these questions lurk
larger questions of policy and power which, while yet unrecog-
nized, wield their subtle influence on the course of decision and
consequently on people's general conceptions of "what is law-
ful." The larger questions of delegation of power and due
process, both in relation to the labor provisions and to those pro-
viding for administrative and judicial review, can only be lightly
touched on within the limited bounds of this paper. However,
the most penetrating and yet the most elusive factor in all this
background, the fact of the emergency and the effect of that
fact on the other legal considerations, must be reckoned with
more completely. It will be developed that any significance of
this factor for lawyers is that its correct application in a par-
ticular case will depend upon a sensitive inquiry into the judicial
temper of the particular court at the particular time. In other
words, to discuss in terms "the emergency doctrine" is but to
state in another way that courts are subject to influence in their
way by the atmospheric considerations which, under the guise
of discretionary exercise of power, it has always been recognized
are subject to the administrative agencies of government.
Finally, throughout this study it is necessary to bear in
mind two factors, oft-unrecognized, oft-unreeognizable, which,
indescribable and evasive as they are, characterize much of the
action and influence a great deal of the consideration of the
Louisville & Nashville v. United States, 10 Fed. Supp. 185 (N. D.
Ill. E. D. 1934).
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Emergency Act and its administration, namely, the kind of
economic and social world-within-a-world that is being dealt
with,21 and the man that was Federal Coordinator of Transpor-
tation, Joseph B. Eastman.22
II
EMERGENCY RAI.RoAD TRANSPORTATION ACT, 1933
A. Background of the Act
"Coordination" in the transportation world was neither
new nor uniquely American in the year 1933. Whether it be
called a "principle" or an "idea" or by any other name, the
word "Coordination" stood for something very real in man's
experience, something very useful and very powerful which
might be readily and profitably applied in new ways when
called upon in situations such as that in which the railroads were
to be found in the winter and spring of 1933, the period during
which the Emergency Act 23 was evolved.
The need, the emergency, which thus evoked Congressional
action was the extremely serious financial and consequent phys-
2 "The railroad world is like a state within a state. Its population
of 3 million, if we include the families of workers, has its own customs
and its own vocabulary, and lives according to rules of its own mak-
ing. It is struggling to sustain a public debt of some twelve billion
dollars, to satisfy the holders of some ten billions of stock, and to meet
the competition of rival principalities who carry by water, air, pipe-
line, and highway." L. J. Garrison in "The National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, A Unique Administrative Agency", 46 Yale L. J. 567, at
568 (1937) pointing out in a footnote that there is no sharp line of
demarcation between labor and management.
"See Part III, infra.
"Reference should be made at the outset to the phenomenal coin-
cidence of the deeply aroused interest in coordination of transportation
agencies and facilities at the time in a great number of countries of
the world. A study made by the Department of Commerce published
in 1933 (Railway and Highway Transportation Abroad) began: "A
world-wide movement designed to effect national coordination of land,
air, and water transportation is under way. It began on a broad scale
less than three years ago, but so rapidly has it progressed that today
coordination is either being tested or approached in every country of
importance that has rail lines." In England, France, Germany, New
Zealand and Argentina comprehensive coordination has been effected.
(See generally, 55 Traf. Wld. 447; and as to France and Germany,
H. E. Dougall "Some Lessons Drawn from European Experience", 25
Am. Econ. Rev. Supp. 111 (1935). In England there bad been in
existence a Commission on Coordination in Transportation since 1929.
The Salter Report in 1932 flowing from the Conference on Rail and
Road Transport followed on the work of the Royal Commission on
Transport, 1930. (Ministry of Transport, Report of the Conference on
Rail and Road Transportation, July 29, 1932.) On the basis of this
conference and report the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933 (23 and 24
George V 988, 1039) was enacted, which, amongst other things, set
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ical condition of the railroad industry of the United States.
This was largely an inevitable accompanying phenomenon of the
world-wide depression which started in October, 1929, but it was
also the result of a number of other forces and factors, peculiar
to the industry, which had made themselves felt increasingly
after 1920: among others, severe and unrestrained competition
from other types of transportation agencies, which were subject
to less stringent governmental regulation, 24 and the natural con-
servatism which pervades the industry, which renders it pecu-
liarly insensitive to, and therefore retards adjustment to, chang-
ing needs and requirements. 2 5 The railroads had given out on
everyone :26 the consumer of their services, 2 7 the investor,28 the
worker,29 and the public generally.
up a Transport Advisory Council in the Ministry of Transport to
"advise and help him (the Minister of Transport) in connection with
his functions in relation to means and facilities for transport and their
coordination." In Canada a very important report was published in
1932 by the "Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Trans-
portation," (the so-called "Ruff Committee") which in its conclusions
(Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Trans-
portation, 1931-1932) stated the need for: "Machinery ... for coop-
eration between the two systems (Canadian National Railways and
Canadian Pacific Railway) for the elimination of duplicate services
and facilities and the avoidance of extravagance . . ." and for:
".. . the removal of unnecessary or wasteful services or practices to
the avoidance of unwarranted duplication in services and facilities,
and ... the joint use and operation of such properties as may be
conveniently and without undue detriment to either party be so used."
Since that time appropriate legislative action has been taken, and
consequently, to some degree, coordination is now effectively applied
in Canada. (The Canadian National-Canadian Pacific Act, 1933, Part
U1, 23-24 Geo. V 165, 172 et seq., 100 Railway Age 957.)
"'Coordinator's Third Report, House Document 89, 74th Cong. 1st
Sess., p. 10 et sequitur; H. Moulton and Associates "The American
Transportation Problem", pp. 884-895 (1933).
15"The railroad industry is at a difficult crisis and presents a
major national problem.... It has technical aspects, but as frequently
happens, the answer is not to be found primarily in technique ...
the railroad problem is primarily a human relationship problem. It
arose and rests in entrenched antagonisms ... conventional thinking
is usually at the root of our troubles. It is at the root of the railroad
problem." L. Craven, "The Problem of Railroad Competition", 25 Am.
Econ. Rev. Supp. 102 (1935).
21The seriousness of the situation is demonstrated by the figures
showing the tremendous decline in volume of traffic and revenue from
1926 through 1933:
Tons of RevenuePassengers Freight Total Op. Rev.
Carried -thousands- Pass. and Frt.
1926 874,589 1,439,612 $5,955,191
1929 786,432 1,419,383 5,774,997
1932 480,718 687,854 2,862,986
1933 434,848 733,391 2,858,784
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In the face of such a situation, the seriousness of wbieh
became more and more widely appreciated as the national depres-
sion deepened,, various organized groups of those affected be-
came aroused and began to demand some kind of action. Par-
21 To the user of the railroad, the shipper and the traveler, this
condition meant inadequate and antiquated service and excessive rates.
Available Service to Users of Railroad Service (Ibid. 1933 s-99)
Passenger Freight





Estimated Undermaintenance of Service Facilities, total for all
Railroads of the United States, as of the spring of 1933, $1,000,000,000
(Statement by Commissioner Eastman. Harings, "Emergency Rail-
road Transportation Act, 1933", Senate Com. on Interstate Commerce,
p. 53).
Cost of Freight Service and the General Price Level
(General Price Index from Federal Bank of N. Y., 80 Standard
Trade and Securities, No. 29, 0-17. Other statistics from I. C. C.
Statistics, 1933, S-99.)
General Price Freight Rev.
Index per Ton-Mile Index
(1913=100) (1913=100)
1913 100 .729 100
1926 171 1.096 150
1927 171 1.095 150
1928 176 1.094 150
1929 179 1.088 149
1930 168 1.074 147
1931 150 1.062 145
1932 132 1.056 145
1933 129 1.009 138
21 To the investor it meant that the value of most railroad securi-
ties had been reduced and was uncertain, as the showing of the indus-
try as a whole well indicates.
Not Income or Deficit Class I Railroads






Percentage of Railroad Mileage in Receivership or Trusteeship on
December 31, 1938: 16%
(Interstate Commerce Commission, Annual Report, 1934, p. 4)
As a result, railroad credit as a whole was desperately impaired,
which meant that the only source of capital was the Federal Govern-
ment, which required high grade collateral for its loans.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Loans Authorized by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, 1932-1933
(Ibid. 1932, 258; ibid. 1933, 129; ibid. 1934, 155)
1931 $346,829,179 (69 railroads)
1932 88,102,096 (24 railroads)
1933 82,958,575 ( 9 railroads)
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ticular interest groups began to exert themselves in an effort to
find some solution to "the transportation problem" or to some
phase of it most directly related to their particular source of
complaint. From many sides came the call for a national trans-
portation policy.30 Naturally also, numerous agencies in the
Federal government had become concerned, and were devoting
much effort to the study of the problems involved. 31
Through all these efforts there shows more and more clearly
"To the employee it meant insecurity of employment and the
possibility of further wage decreases:
Average Number of Employees for the Year and Total Compensation




See, for example, G. L. Wilson, "The American Transportation
Crisis" (1933). S. L. Miller, "The Principles of Inland Transporta-
tion," Ch. XL (1933); and compare C. S. Duncan, "A National Trans-
portation Policy" (1936). Of the particular interest groups, the most
notable was the group of insurance companies, banking associations,
dealers in railroad supplies, and universities holding railroad securi-
ties which appointed Bernard Baruch, Calvin Coolidge, Clark Howell,
Alexander Legge and Alfred E. Smith to serve as the National Trans-
portation Committee, the conclusions of which, together with the
underlying data amassed by Harold G. Moulton and the Brookings
Institution, were published as "The American Transportation Prob-
lem" (1933). To this committee another group, the Joint Committee
of Railroads and Highway Users, voluntarily submitted its report
(51 Traf. Wld. 239). Other active groups were those shippers and sup-
ply dealers who made up the National Transportation Conference
(See report, that title, 1933-1934), the members of the Associated
Traffic Clubs (See 52 Traf. Wld. 737), the National Industrial Traffic
League (See 52 Traf. Wld. 851), the newly formed American Trans-
portation Association (See 55 Traf. Wld. 733), and the United States
Chamber of Commerce (See Report on Competing Forms of Trans-
portation, See. 1932, 50 Traf. Wld. 1285).
"The Interstate Commerce Commission had conducted several gen-
eral investigations (Ex Parte 104-Practices of Carriers Affecting Reve-
nues and Expenses. 209 I. C. C. and 210 I. C. C. (1935); Coordination
of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263 (1932); Duplication of Pro-
duce Terminals, 188 I. C. C. 323 (1932); General Rate Level Investiga-
tion, 1933, 195 I. C. C. 5 (1933); Increases in Intrastate Freight Rates,
186 I. C. C. 615 (1932), and had urged specific legislative remedies for
some of the evils. (Annual Report, 1932, pp. 100-103.)
The Department of Commerce, following a general session on the
transportation question at the White House on April 1, 1933, organ-
ized two conferences to carry on the discussion. One was attended
by representatives of the shippers, railroad management, the investors,
and the financial interests, and was marked by the extraordinary
statement by President Loree of the Delaware & Hudson Company,
that an annual saving of one and a half billion dollars, through
coordination and abandonment of unprofitable services, was possible
(51 Traf. Wld. 676), the other was devoted to a study of the various
proposals by railway labor executives.
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one important truth: there was need of greater cooperation by
all the agencies and individual companies concerned. The idea
of coordination offered the greatest hope, not coordination as
an abstract or ethereal conception but as a concrete process or
method forged during the long and painful experience of gen-
erations of railroad men. The history of the railroads of Amer-
ica is from the beginning the story of the gradual linkage and
integration of a vast number of single isolated units and types
of facilities into more and more of a single, unified national
transportation system. 32 The Great War hastened this process, 33
'*In the earliest days of railroads transportation people had been
forced to find ways to exchange freight with canal, stage coach, and
other railroad lines. At the time canal boats would be hauled on flat
cars over certain distances much as loaded trucks are so hauled today.
The movement for the interchange of cars, having overcome local
statutory restrictions, was successful in the fifties, as was the move-
ment for the standardization of gauge in the seventies. On the other
side of the picture it appears that it was by virtue of governmental
requirement that the air brake and the automatic coupler were uni-
versally installed. Nor was State action effective in preventing wide-
spread pooling of traffic by the railroads from 1870 to 1887 (See two
very interesting monographs printed as Langstroth & Stilz, "Railway
Cooperation" (1899)), in connection with which there grew up rail-
road "territories" with their own associations for classification and
other rate-making purposes. In 1886 the two "Time Conventions"
which had been formed earlier to facilitate time calculation for pas-
senger service schedules were merged to form the American Railway
Association, the main function of which, during its early years was to
formulate freight car interchange practice and supplementary rules.
Its Car Service Division and Shippers Advisory Board have handled
the car distribution problem very well. What collective action there
was by railroad managements in the years just prior to 1933 was taken
through the Association of Railway Executives, which was concerned
largely with matters of Federal legislation and other matters of large
public consequence.
1 On the declaration of war the railroads had immediately banded
themselves closer together in a serious effort to meet the extraordinary
demands made on them, and there was evolved the War Control Board,
to which was entrusted by the individual roads a considerable amount
of power, but conditions proved to be too extreme for even this
unprecedented cooperation by the railroads, as was later explained by
Walter D. Hines, a railroad executive who was the first Assistant
Director under Government control and later became Director-General,
in this way: "Unification to make existing facilities go as far as
possible had not been achieved" (W. D. Hines, "War History of Ameri-
can Railroads" (1928), p. 20).
Thereupon by Presidential Proclamation, the Federal Government
took over the operation of the railroads. The Director-General was
given complete authority over the entire railroad system of the coun-
try to the extent necessary to fulfill the needs of the government in
war. In the actual course of administration, however, although there
were some changes in the details of organization, considerable power
was left in the hands of the officers of the individual railroads, who
remained in the places where they had been before, and the Director-
General's efforts were largely devoted to the facilitation of the efficient,
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yet after its termination, when Federal legislation set the stage
for still greater cooperation and coordination, there seemed to
be a reaction the other way, which would seem to demonstrate
that coordination in any sense of the word has been accepted
in the railroad world only under the pressure of dire circum-
stances in one practical situation after another. Now again in
1933, with one of the greatest emergencies in their history threat-
ening them with disaster, the railroads were ready to experiment
again. 34
It is probable that the first mention of a Coordinator as a
possible government agency to aid in the solution of the rail-
roads' problems in the 1929 depression was made by Commis-
sioner Eastman himself in a speech before the New York Traffic
Club on May 20, 1931, where he said :35
"In fact if such cooperation cannot be brought about by voluntary act
of the railroads themselves, the alternative is action by the Federal
Government. The study and research into the facts which I have sug-
gested to be necessary could be carried on by a federal agency. It
might be done by the Commission, or a new department of the govern-
ment could be organized for the purpose .. "
With different emphasis, the same theme was taken up by
Commissioner Claude Porter a year later, when he advocated
a Director of Transportation -to supervise regulation and coordi-
through movement of war traffic and to the carrying out of various
steps for the coordination of operation for the sake of economy and of
the freeing of energy and equipment for use elsewhere. These included
the elimination of excess passenger train service, terminal unification
and the consolidation of ticket agencies and station facilities, and the
elimination of circuitous routing of freight. In a real sense coordina-
tion was put into effect on the railroads during the war, even though
its effectiveness was very much diminished by the purely provisional
character of Federal control.
'4Added stimulus was given to many by the presence of the
spectre of government ownership or operation, a presence which was
very real (W. M. Daniels, "Towards Nationalized Railroads", 41 Cur-
rent History 411 (1935)). After the passage of the Act, Kenneth Bur-
gess, a former general solicitor of the Burlington Route, remarked,
"The whole scheme of the Emergency Act is an effort to avoid the
necessity of government ownership". 52 Traf. Wld. 852 (1933).
There was, in some circles, energetic agitation for outright con-
solidation on a large scale; among the plans urged were the Prince
Plan, reprinted annually in Poor's "Railroads" 1933-1935, the Theo-
dore Prince Plan, described in House Hearings on the Emergency
Act, pp. 141-147, and the Amster Unification Plan, referred to, ibid.,
122-125; the Commission's own plan, as modified, was not without its
supporters, Consolidation of Railroads, 63 L C. C. 455 (1921), 159
I. C. C. 522 (1929), and 185 I. C. C. 403 (1932).
547 Traf. Wld. 1264.
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nation of the five chief forms of transport.36 Ar. Roosevelt in
his famous Salt Lake City campaign speech went on record as
being strongly in favor of a comprehensive reorganization of
the railroad and regulatory structure through consolidation and
the elimination of wasteful competition, declaring the principles
of his policy to be: 3
.. avoid financial excesses; adjust plant to traffic; coordinate all
carrier service; above all, serve the public reasonably, swiftly and
well."
The suggestion as thus developed was incorporated in modi-
fied form in the recommendations of the National Transporta-
tion Committee.3 8 In its report were embodied not only proposals
for the unification of regulation but also strong proposals for
the elimination of competitive and other wastes, and through it
these found their way into some legislation that was drafted
and proposed by a group of leading railroad executives, and
submitted to the Department of Commerce in April, 1933.
For a better understanding of the railroads' proposition,
reference must be made to the large-scale experiment which was
being made at that very time by the Western railroads. On
December 15, 1932, they had set up a coordinating committee
under a "Commissioner of Western Railroads," to whom had
been delegated wide powers as to pooling, service, rate matters,
and preventable waste, with a duty to conduct research. 39 While
this scheme was sufficiently slow in being put into execution so
that it was overtaken by the Emergency Act before any great
spectacular results appeared, it did furnish something of a patter
to guide the draughtsmen of the proposed legislation. In the
bill the problem of competitive waste was to be attacked by
6Speech before National Association of Railroad and Utility Com-
missions at Hot Springs, Arkansas, New York Times, November 27,
1932, VIII, 11.
New York Times, Sept. 18, 1932, p. 32.
"I The majority, with reference to the reorganization of the Com-
mission, urged that: "Either one man or at most an executive com-
mittee of three, should have exclusive responsibility and authority In
all executive functions." (Report printed in "The American Transpor-
tation Problem", lii). And Alfred E. Smith remarked provocatively:
"I favor the abolition of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the creation in its place of a new department of transportation headed
by one man, or a one-man bureau in the Department of Commerce
determining policies with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce.
What we need is a new transportation system, not endless hearings on
a system that does not work." (Ibid., p. lvii.)
-" 51 Traf. Wld. 689, 779.
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regional coordinating committees of railroad executives in the
eastern, southern, and western regions of the country, to which
were to be entrusted full powers to carry out coordination meas-
ures and to issue orders in the enforcement thereof, free from
the restrictions of the anti-trust laws, and which were to be
aided by a Federal Coordinator who was to have powers both of
extensive investigation and of review over committee orders, with
final, though optional, review of action taken vested in the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. The bill was refererd to a com-
mittee consisting of Commissioner Eastman, Dr. W. M. W.
Splawn, then chief counsel to the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, and A. Lane
Cricher, chief of the Transportation Division in the Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, which had been set up after
the April conferences at the Department of Commerce to study
"the Prince Plan" and other proposals then made, and it formed
the basis of the draft for a proposed bill which this committee
then reported to the President. After a small conference at the
White House further hearings were held for representatives of
the various interested groups. Thereupon the President ap-
pointed a committee of six, which was known as "the President's
Committee," to complete the fnal preparation of the measure
for submission to the Congress.40
On May 4, 1933, in submitting the prepared measure to the
Congress President Roosevelt recommended:
"as a temporary measure ... the creation of a Federal coordinator
of transportation who, working with groups of railroads, will be able
to encourage, promote, or require action on the part of carriers, in
order to avoid duplication of service, prevent waste, and encourage
financial reorganizations. Such a coordinator should also, in carrying
out this policy, render useful service in maintaining railroad employ-
ment at a fair wage.""
0Its members were Commissioner Eastman, Secretary of Com-
merce Roper, Dr. Splawn, Senator Dill (Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce), Representative Rayburn (Chairman
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) and
Secretary of the Treasury Woodin; Senate Hearings, p. 11, House Docu-
ment, 324 Ser. 9751, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess.
"Referring to Title I of the Emergency Act. Title II, which is
not relevant to the immediate purposes here, although extremely im-
portant in the development of the Interstate Commerce Act because
of its repeal of the recapture clause, of its broadening of the consoli-




"The experience gained during the balance of this year will greatly
assist the Government and the carriers in preparation for a more
permanent and a more comprehensive national transportation policy at
the regular session of Congress in 1934."
From the last sentence it is clear that the Act was submitted
as an experiment, and it is interesting to observe the note struck
here (that this was only very temporary) in the light of the
developments later on when a good many people came to think of
the Coordinator more as a permanent agency. Also refererd
to in the message were the railroads' most pressing problems of
the day in the suggestive key-words: "waste," "financial reor-
ganizations," and "maintaining railroad employment."
At the close of the Presidential message the tentative Act
was introduced into the Senate as Senate Resolution 158042 and
into the House as House Resolution 5500,43 and was referred to
the appropriate committees. The important problems raised by
the President and many others were fully discussed in the com-
mittee hearings, which lasted four days in the Senate with fifteen
witnesses44 and nine days with eighteen witnesses and four state-
ments in the House.4 5 Among the main witnesses heard by the
committees were Secretary Roper and two members of his origi-
nal committee, Commissioner Eastman, whose testimony was
more extended than that of any other, Dr. Splawn, Carl Gray of
the Union Pacific for the large railroads, R. V. Fletcher, general
counsel of the Railway Executives, and Donald Richberg, repre-
senting the Railway Labor Executives' Association. Also repre-
sented were the State Commissions, the Electric Railways, the
Short lines, the National Industrial Traffic League, the National
League of Commission Merchants, the People's Lobby, the Water
Carriers, and various labor interests. It was well established
during the course of the testimony that the Coordinator was not
to be a "czar," that his function in the line of research and
study loomed very important in the minds of most of the wit-
nesses, and that the labor question was the most delicate one
presented by the bill. While the railroad managements accepted
the bill, which differed radically from theirs in certain respects,
77 Cong. Rec. 2860.
1177 Cong. Rec. 2908.
"Senate Hearings, Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933.
45 House Hearings, Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933.
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without enthusiasm, and labor looked on its passage as inevitable
and so contented itself with offering numerous sweeping amend-
ments, and the State Commissioners were represented as being
apprehensive about the Coordinator's power over their work, the
representatives of the Administration stood out strongly for this
bill. That action was needed, all were agreed, yet whenever a
provision affected the particular interest, then the bill was defec-
tive, in the eyes of those concerned with that interest.
Like most legislation the final enactment represented a com-
promise between conflicting interests and to some extent between
conflicting theories. Few important changes and additions had
been made to the original draft presented by the President's
Committee. The short lines, well remembering the rough han-
dling they received during the regime of the Director-General
during the War, sought amendment, not accepted in Committee,
to prevent unfair elimination of joint routes. 46 Both the short
lines and the electric lines sought representation on the regional
coordinating committees.4 7 Further safeguards were inserted
for the interests of the States.43 The investigatory duties of
the Coordinator were clarified by the specification of labor con-
ditions and relations as a subject of study.49 Section 16, mak-
ing special provision for court appeal, was also added. Far more
important, however, was the entirely new Section 7, the labor
section, which was inserted by the Senate Committee after the
close of the hearings.50 As will later appear, the practical
1 Senate Hearings, pp. 175-179, 192-195. The Final Amendment,
the Proviso in Section 4 of the Act, was added on the floor of the
Senate.
'7 This found its way into Section 2 of the Act.
In Secs. 9 and 16.
Sec. 13.
FO The Committee explained its action in this way: "Your com-
mittee gave the most careful consideration to the proposals of the
railroad labor executives. They insisted that economies to be secured
should not result in additional dismissal of large numbers of railroad
employees. More than 750,000 railroad employees have been dropped
from the payrolls during the hard times period. There are approxi-
mately one million men left in service. Your committee believes that
the people as a whole and particularly the railroad employees still in
service, should be assured by the terms of the law itself that there
will be no wholesale dismissals by the Coordinator or the regional com-
mittees. For these reasons your committee amended the bill so the
coordinator cannot dismiss employees, but his orders may result in
reducing the number of employees each year by making it unnecessary
to fill vacancies caused by death, retirement or resignation. In case
business improves and more employees are needed, the coordinator
can make an order to absorb that additional number so long as the
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effect of the addition of this provision was to transform the entire
nature of the Act. Section 7 also now provided for the com-
pensation for employee property losses resulting from the execu-
tion of coordination projects. Thus amended, the Emergency
Act was brought onto the floor of Congress.51
In the Senate after two days of debate the Emergency Act,
which had been in charge of Chairman Dill of the Committee on
Interstate Commerce, was passed,52 and nine days later in the
House, where Representatives Rayburn and Parker had been in
charge of it, similar action was taken.53 In neither house was
this debate very exhaustive or spirited.54 Supporters urged the
particular facts of the emergency situation out of which the Act
had grown, the universal demand for action, and the general
support of the various interests for this proposal, which repre-
sented only a mild advance in regulation and which could not
injure labor. Opponents attacked the bill on the one hand as
constituting little more than a re-enactment of certain parts of
the Interstate Commerce Act or, on the other hand, for intro-
ducing dictatorship into railroad regulation. The cry of uncon-
stitutionality was raised twice, by Senator Borah and Repre-
sentative Beck,55 but was not discussed. Doubters questioned
the effect of the labor restrictions, on the one hand, as to their
efficacy in safeguarding the interests of labor, and on the other,
as to their devastating effect on the rest of the Statute, except
for Section 13. The need for research and study was unani-
mously recognized and generally favored, yet emphasis on the
more controversial issues diverted, to some extent, attention from
that very salutary provision. Particularly stressed was the
danger of encroachment on the rights and on the regulative prac-
tices of the States, and Senator Wheeler, now (1937) chairman
of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, attacked the
measure as a scheme of a small number of selfish investors in
railroad securities to preserve their investments in time of
present number of employees is reduced." (Senate Report 87, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess., printed in 77 Cong. Rec. 4250.)
5 See Senate Report, supra, and House Report 193, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess.
77 Cong. Rec. 4441.
77 Cong. Rec. 4999.
6 In the Senate, 77 Cong. Rec. 4247, et seq. 4429, et seq. IA the
House, 77 Cong. Rec. 4852, et seq., 4934, et seq.
77 Cong. Rec. 4434, 4946.
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stress.5 6 In general, the broad outline of the proposed purpose
and function of the Coordinator and his office was adequately
and sympathetically placed before the Congress, and the over-
bearing good sense of it at a time when action was desperately
needed assured its passage from the start.57
B. The Act
On June 16, 1933, the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act, 1933, became effective. It contained two titles, the first
dealing primarily with temporary emergency measures, and the
second embracing permanent amendments, to the Interstate
Commerce Act. The latter, although of great significance, are
not strictly relevant to a study of the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation.5 8
The main structure of Title I consists of provisions estab-
lishing the office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation, pro-
vision for regional coordinating committees selected by the car-
riers on the basis of the Coordinator's designation of three
regional divisions of the nation's railroads, specification of the
purposes of the Act and of the powers and duties of the Coordi-
nator and the committees, restriction of the foregoing by the
enumeration of certain safeguards for the rights of employees,
and finally, the sections dealing with review and enforcement
of orders. One section, Section 15, elaborates the standard to
be applied by the Commission in approving railroad applications
for Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans, and, while it is
an emergency measure, is not closely related to the rest of Title I,
and therefore will not be further treated here.
'77 Cong. Rec. 4270-4281.
'The minute differences between the Senate Bill and the House
Bill were ironed out after Conference and the reports approved June 9,
1933 (77 Cong. Rec. 5398, 5435). " One compromise was on the assess-
ment of the railroads, then a unique method of supporting Federal
regulation, yet assented to by them, to the amount of $1.50 a mile
instead of the Senate's $2.00 a mile and the House's $1.00.
8 Sees. 201-209, 48 Stat. 217-221. Title II amends the Interstate
Commerce Act by repealing the recapture clause (the old Section 15-a
as enacted in 1920) and substituting for it general language estab-
lishing a vague standard of reasonableness of rates, by expanding
the authority of the Commission to embrace direct control of holding
companies and by remoulding and strengthening the consolidation and
combination provision of Section 5 in requiring among other things
closer adherence to the Commission's prescribed plan of consolidation
and to the old policy of inter-railroad competition, except when a
Commission order gives relief from the anti-combination provision of
this or any other acts.
K. L. J.-4
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Turning now to an examination of the principal provisions
of the Act in more detail, 9 Section 2 provides for the establish-
ment of the office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation, "in
order to foster and protect interstate commerce in relation to
railroad transportation by preventing and relieving obstructions
and burdens thereon resulting from the present acute economic
emergency, and in order to safeguard and maintain an adequate
system of national transportation." The Coordinator is to choose
his staff without regard to the civil service laws or the Classifica-
tion Act, subject to the approval of the President, and, of course,
he is not to sit on the Commission while it reviews one of his
orders.
Section 3 provides for the division of the carriers of the
country into three groups by the Coordinator, and for the for-
mation of the corresponding regional coordinating committees,
each consisting of five regular members, and two special ones,
one to represent the short lines, and one the electric lines in
matters concerning them.60 The members are to be chosen
through the regular management channels, the vote of each
railroad being accredited according to its mileage, but no rail-
road being allowed more than one representative on any
committee.
The next section, Section 4, declares the purposes of Title I
to be:
"(1) to encourage and promote or require action on the part of the
carriers and of subsidiaries, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act,
as amended, which will (a) avoid unnecessary duplication of services
and facilities of whatsoever nature and permit the joint use of
terminals and trackage incident thereto or requisite to such use: . . "(b) control allowances, accessorial services and the charges therefor,
and other practices affecting service or operation, to the end that
undue impairment of net earnings may be prevented, and (c) avoid
other wastes and preventable expense; (2) to promote financial re-
organization of the carriers, with due regard to legal rights, so as to
59Section 1 is devoted to definition of terms. "Coordination" is
not defined.
6 These special members were provided for at the instance of the
representatives of these lines. See suggested amendments by H. R.
Burford, General Counsel of the Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad,
Senate Hearings, p. 172, and by C. D. Cass, of the American Transit
Association (electric lines), Ibid., p. 175.
InAt this point was inserted a proviso, at the instance of Senator
Huey Long, always astute to support the cause of the short lines and
the local interests: "That no routes now existing shall be eliminated
except with the consent of all participating lines or upon order of the
Coordinator."
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reduce fixed charges to the extent required by the public interest and
improve carrier credit; (3) to provide for the immediate study of
other means of improving conditions surrounding transportation in all
its forms and the preparation of plans therefor."
This section is the key-section of the whole statute. It offers
guidance to courts in interpreting other sections. It outlines
the broad considerations which evoked the statute and suggests
an approach to the resolution of latent ambiguities elsewhere in
the statute. In other words, this section sets the tone, provides
the medium against which the detailed provisions of the remain-
ing sections of the Title are projected.
The following section puts on the committees the duty of
initiating carrier action to carry out the purposes enumerated
in paragraph 1 of Section 4, so far as can be voluntarily accom-
plished by the carriers. In cases where they are unable so to do,
the Coordinator is given the power to issue orders, if in the
public interest and "in furtherance of the purposes of this
title." Section 6 provides for cooperation between the Coordi-
nator and the committees, and he is given access to all records
and other necessary materials, and in addition, the members
and examiners of the Commission are given power to administer
oaths and require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of materials and the taking of
depositions in his aid, and the same rights, privileges, and immu-
nities are accorded persons testifying that apply to persons tes-
tifying before that body. As to orders, this section provides
that:
"If, in any Instance, a committee has not acted with respect to any
matter which the Coordinator has brought to its attention and upon
which he is of the opinion that it should have acted, under the pro-
visions of Section 5, he is hereby authorized and directed to issue
and enforce such order, giving appropriate directions to the carriers
and subsidiaries subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended,
with respect to such matter, as he shall find to be consistent with the
public Interest."
This section provides the club which the Coordinator can hold
over the heads of those railroads who do not wish to cooperate.
In the previous section room was allowed for action when taken
on the initiative of the carriers, here the broadest discretionary
power is granted, the only apparent standard being, if the words
of the section alone be taken, consistency with the public interest.
Latent in much of this language are ambiguities. The more strik-
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ing of these, as for example, that in the words "if a committee
has not acted", will be discussed later.6 2
The vital labor section, Section 7, is the most controversial
in the Act. It first permits labor organizations, both those repre-
sented in the Chicago agreement of 193263 and those not so rep-
resented, to form parallel committees to the regional committees,
and confers upon the latter, or the Coordinator, as the case may
be, the duty to confer with the former before taking action
affecting their interests. Paragraph b, the crucial one, limits the
reduction in the number of employees of any carriers "by reason
of any action taken pursuant to the authority of this title" below
the level existent in May, 1933, less a deduction, not exceeding
5% a year, of the number of employees who have died, resigned
or normally retired. This paragraph further guarantees to each
employee who was on the payroll in May that he shall not "be
deprived of employment such as he had during said month of
May or be in a worse position with respect to his compensation
for such employment, by reason of any action taken pursuant to
the authority conferred by this title." The legal questions
raised by this paragraph will be dealt with later, so suffice it to
remark that more sweeping language in a statute than this
would be hard to find.
Section 7, paragraph (c), authorizes the establishment of
regional boards similar to those provided for in the Railway
Labor Act6 4 for the settlement of controversies arising out of
action taken under the authority of the Act, also for the com-
pensation of employees for losses suffered from transfers from
one community to another on account of coordination activities.
Finally, paragraph (e) requires the carriers, "whether under
control of a judge, trustee, receiver, or private management" to
comply with the Railway Labor Act and with those parts of the
Hastings Bankruptcy Act 5 which forbids the change of wages
or conditions of railroad employees other than in accordance
with the Railway Labor Act or the Chicago agreement, and also
which forbids the exercise of influence over the employee's choice
6 Part III, infra.
1 This embraced practically all the Brotherhoods and major rail-
road organization of the country, in the direct line of operating and




as to labor organizations, which includes outlawry of yellow dog
contracts.
The publication and taking effect of orders, which are to
remain in effect until vacated by the Coordinator or suspended
or set aside by the Commission "or some other lawful authority,
as hereinafter provided" is provided for in Section 8, which
also affTms the power of the Coordinator over pooling arrange-
ments and compensation for the use of property as he deems
necessary or desirable.
Because Section 9, which outlines rather fully the procedure
to be followed in administrative review of Coordinator orders,
is extremely important, for the sake of accuracy it is set out in
full here:
"Any interested party, including, among others, any carrier, subsidiary,
shipper, or employee, or any group of carriers, shippers, or employees,
or any state commission, or the Governor of any State, or the
official representative or representatives of any political subdivision
thereof, dissatisfied with any order of the Coordinator may, at any
time prior to the effective date of the order, file a petition with the
Commission asking that such order be reviewed and suspended pend-
ing such review, and stating fully the reasons therefor. Such petitions
shall be governed by such general rules as the Commission may estab-
lish. If the Commission, upon considering such petition and any
answer or answers thereto, finds reason to believe that the order may
be unjust to the petitioner or inconsistent with the public interest, the
Commission is hereby authorized to grant such review and, in its dis-
cretion, the Commission may suspend the order if it finds immediate
enforcement thereof would result in irreparable damage to the peti-
tioner or work grave injury to the public interest, but if the Commis-
sion suspends an order, it shall expedite the hearing and decision oil
that order as much as possible. Thereupon the Commission shall,
after due notice and a public hearing, review the order and take such
action in accord with the purposes of this title as it finds to be just and
consistent with the public interest, either confirming the order or set-
ting it aside or reissuing it in modified form, and any order so con-
firmed or reissued shall thereafter remain in effect until vacated or
modified by the Commission."
Section 10 relieves the carriers, when under order and to
the extent required by the order, from the operation of the
Anti-Trust Laws and "of all other restraints or prohibitions by
law, State or Federal, other than health or safety measures,
except the requirements of the Railway Labor Act." This broad
and significant provision is modeled on paragraph 15 of Section
5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. It then provides for notice
to State officials before orders are issued which affect their inter-
est. The strong concern on the part of certain outspoken legis-
lators for interests of the individual states and their regulations
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was responsible for the emphasis placed on the safeguarding of
the States' interests, which is illustrated by this extra check on
the 'issuance of orders which afford relief from any State law
or order:
"The Coordinator shall issue no order ... unless such order is neces-
sary, in his opinion, to prevent or remove an obstruction to or a
burden upon interstate commerce."
The following section protects existing contractual obligations
incurred prior to the enactment of the Act "with regard to the
location or maintenance of offices, shops, or roundhouses at any
point," and then in turn are penal provisions providing heavy
fines for non-compliance with orders, prosecutions for which are
to be by United States District Attorneys. 60 There is also a pro-
viso affording protection against enforced personal service and
against interference with individual or collective "refusal" to
work
In the light of the subsequent administrative history Section
13 is by far the most important. In prescribing the Coordinator's
duties of investigation the Congress directed studies over a very
wide area. They were to be comprehensive and extensive under
the general head of considering "means of improving transporta-
tion conditions throughout the country." Cost finding, labor,
and legislation were specifically referred to, and also the ability
of'the railroads, "financial and otherwise," to help themselves.
-In general, the language was broad and the Coordinator free
to carry on about what he wanted to within the broad limits, but
its tone strongly indicated that the purpose of the studies was
to aid management and take the industry's point of view rather
-than the attitude of a regulatory body studying these problems
from a government point of view.
The next section, number 14, provides for the method of
financing the Coordinator's work, unusual in the field of Federal
regulation at that date, by assessment of the roads on a mileage
basis, ;7 and the final two sections 8 are concerned with court
The imposition of a. duty on the district attorneys "to prosecute
. . . all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provision
of this title ana for the punishment of all violations thereof ... " Indi-
cates that the non-criminal remedies employed in enforcing orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission are intended to be authorized
in addition to the ordinary criminal ones.
6T For the first year this was $1.50 a mile, for the second ;2.00
(48 Stat. 954), and for the third $2.00 (49 Stat. 376).
61 Section 15 is the section dealing with Commission review of
R. F. C. loans.
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review of orders under the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation
Act 9 (as all Commission orders are reviewable) and the dura-
tion of the Title (which is to be one year, unless extended a year
or less by Presidential Proclamation), but Coordinator orders or
Commission orders made under Title I are to remain in effect
until vacated by the Commission "or other lawful authority,"
but this does not apply to so much of any order as affords relief
from a State law or State commission order. By proclamation
of Mlay 4, 1934, the Statute was so extended, and by Senate Joint
Resolution 112 of June 14, 1935, it was extended for the third
year,70 which kept it in effect through June 17, 1936, at which
time the Congress failed to take the necessary action, with the
result that Title I passed out of existence on that day.
This survey of the provisions of the emergency title of the
Act 71 demonstrates that the final product of the legislative
process was still in conformity with the letter and spirit of the
President's message. The original scheme brought forward by
the railroads of setting up regional committees with powers and
duties to carry out joint action with the cooperation of a Federal
officer and free from the restraints of the Anti-Trust Laws had
been substantially preserved. The power sought by the railroads
for the committees had been vested in the Coordinator, though
their duties remained much the same. The power to order, as
set forth in Sections 5 and 6, and as necessarily delimited by
Section 4, if such a wide declaration of purposes could be said
to "delimit," was very broad. Roughly, any order which in
the Coordinator's mind would make for the elimination of waste
and rehabilitation of the American railroad system, would be
permissible. Accordingly, the Coordinator was empowered by
these words to become in fact, if he would, the manager of the
railroads' affairs. In the light of subsequent developments and
the kind of discussion to which this paper must confine itself
0 38 Stat. 219.
It 49 Stat. 376.
"For discussion of and comment on the Act, see E. C. Goddard,
"The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933", 31 Mich. L. R.
1112 (1933); R. W. Harbeson of "The Emergency Railroad Transpor-
tation Act, 1933", 42 Journal Pol. Econ. 106 (1934); S. E. Harris,
"Economic Legislation of the 73rd Congress",43 Econ. Journal- 642-645(1933), I. Sharfman, "The Interstate Commerce Commission", III A,
424-430 (1935); Note, 29 I1. L. R. 506 (1934); Note, 48 H. L. R. 1382(1935).
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this aspect is apt to be obscured, but it is a point which should
not be passed over.
To return to the all-important Section 4, one thing that
stands out is the emphasis on voluntary action by carriers. The
purpose is "to encourage and promote or require action."
Clearly this legislation is in line with other recovery legislation
which attempts to bring about desirable results by stimulating
joint action, leaving somewhere in the background power to
bring about similar results by legal process if all other means
fail. This legislation is not primarily legislation for the "con-
trol" of the railroads, but rather one for the performance of
"service'".72 Of the latter inevitably some regulation was a nec-
essary consequence, but it is important to notice that of the two
demands made of emergency legislation, namely, extension and
unification of government regulation of transportation and the
elimination of competitive and other wastes, only the latter was
directly dealt with by Title I. To the disposition of the Coordi-
nator under Section 13 were referred all suggestions for further
extension of regulation.
Not only was the power to order implicitly restricted by the
emphasis placed in Section 4, but it was explicitly restricted by
Section 7. The nicely balanced machinery which had been set up
by earlier portions of the statute was, to state it mildly, dis-
turbed and deranged by the restrictions the effect of which was
to freeze the total railroad payroll at the point where it was in
May, 1933, with but small allowance for natural reductions, and
to give each railroad employee something of a "vested right" in
his job, at least with reference to any action taken by the car-
riers under the Act. As a result, serious consideration of the
effect of the restrictions in the particular situation involved was
necessary even before an order could be contemplated by the
Coordinator. In his testimony before the Congressional Com-
mittees, Commissioner Eastman had suggested the following as
a partial list of possible areas for the operation of the Act, add-
ing suggested remedies (in parenthesis) :73
Unnecessary duplication of service or facilities, including
Wastes at large railroad centers (joint use of freight and passenger
terminals, etc.)
73The distinction is taken from Ernst Freund, "Administrative
Powers Over Persons and Property", Chapter 1 (1928).
71 Senate Hearings, p. 20; House Hearings, p. 32.
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Unnecessary passenger and freight train service (pooling)
Use of circuitous routes
Extravagance in the solicitation of traffic
Waste in equipment repair expense (joint use of shops)
Waste in passenger ticket offices (consolidated ticket offices)
Reduction of unprofitable services (substitution of motor transporta-
tion)
Wasteful practices in Merchandise Traffic Handling (cooperation be-
tween railroads)
Wasteful practices in the operation of unnecessary motor-bus or truck
service paralleling rail service
Unsatisfactory accounting practices
Unnecessary allowances to large shippers for services
Unduly low charges for warehousing and accessorial services
Waste in the use of Equipment (pooling, change in car-rentals)
Wasteful practices in purchasing equipment, supplies, etc.
Wasteful practices in the payment of damage claims
Wasteful practices in dealing with freight forwarding companies
Wasteful rate policies (to be met by general plans to adjust the freight
rate structure to modern needs)
It is submitted that of all these items only the last eight would
be free from the labor restrictions. Conceding that there is a
small area left by the 5% a year allowance for the reduction of
forces in connection with the upper nine items and that other
savings might be made without the discharge of labor, the power-
ful fact still remains that the great savings most railroad men
had anticipated were largely at the expense of labor, and that
these now were substantially blocked. This condition was bound
to exist in the railroad industry, because it is a service industry
the rendition of which depends to an exceedingly large degree
on human labor. 74 The result of this condition was, as will
appear subsequently, that the machinery set up by the early
sections of the act was from the start practically idle, except
insofar as a function was found for it in connection with the
great volume of work done under Section 13 and in connection
therewith.
The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, in com-
mon with the National Industrial Recovery Act75 and the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act,76 as well as with the Interstate Com-
merce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act in 1920,77 was
strengthened by a provision affording relief from the Anti-Trust
"Wages average about 60% of railroad operating expenses. Com-
mittee on Public Relations of Eastern Railroads, "A Yearbook of Rail-
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Laws and other State and Federal laws restricting its action.
Here the Congress granted a very broad dispensing power to the
Coordinator. No law or governmental order in the United States
was beyond his power, if it interfered with the carrying out of
his functions under the Act. Yet again, as in the case of Sections
5 and 6, if this were construed along with the general purpose
and aims of the statute, it was far less broad than appears at
first blush. Its indispensability cannot be disputed, for the
enforced competition policy of both the Interstate Commerce
Act and the Anti-Trust Laws flatly conflicts with the methods
and immediate aims of coordination as set forth above.
In sum, the Emergency Act, which was once termed "prob-
ably as complicated and complex a bill as ever came before the
Congress of the United States,"17 8 like most pieces of legislation
represents a piece of patchwork. Onto the strong basic structure
embodying machinery well adapted to carry out that kind of
coordination which many interests had called for and the rail-
roads themselves had proposed for themselves, were appended
qualifications and restrictions dictated by policies seemingly in
direct conflict with the policy of coordination to eliminate waste.
(The policy of maintaining employment at the May, 1933, level
was in apparent conflict with the policy of cutting expenses by
the elimination of those employees whose services were really of
no benefit to the railroad economy in order to strengthen the
railroads' financial position.) In practice the appendages dic-
tated the fate of the Act, and the effectiveness of the dominant
policy of encouraging coordination, while not completely or
permanently checked by it, .was in a measure retarded thereby,
and the carrying out of that ,policy because of them, largely
forced into the form of action under one small segment, rather
than under the whole large scheme envisaged by the proposers
of the Act.
(To be concluded in the May issue.)
78 Statement of Representative Parker of New York on the :foor of
the House, 77 Cong. Rec. 4861, referring undoubtedly to the combi-
-nation of the comprehensive emergency measures and the intricate
amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act contained in Title II.
